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T H E  IM P O S SIB IL IT Y  O F Q U IN E ’S IN D ETER M IN A C Y  T H EO R Y  
Duncan M acintosh, Toronto
Quine thinks that the Positivists were wrong to suppose that individual experi­
ences determinately attach to individual expressions. But then, o f course, the meaning 
of a sentence can’t be a function of its experiential associations; the association o f 
different expressions with the same experiences can’t be used as criterial o f their 
synonymy; the analyticity o f a sentence can’t involve the experience-given meanings 
of its components conspiring to make it true in the face of all possible experience; 
there will be no class of expressions privileged to stand in immediate correlation with 
truth-adjudicating experiences, directly referring to them, and subsequently serving 
as the expressions of complexes of which all others are equivalent; nor will it be 
possible to hold the references o f theory-sentences reducible to references of 
observationally basic expressions.
Quine, as a student of language and theory structures, noticed that no sentence 
is subject to empirical confrontation except on assumption o f the truth of sentences 
not intuitively observational, and that intuitively non-observational sentences face 
the tribunal of experience as much as observation-sentences, given the context of 
assumptions, but that the adjudication of sentences is not in general a procedure 
involving a direct relation between individual sentences and bits of the observable 
world. Rather, a given sentence is valued true in an observational circumstance in part 
as a result of that circumstance, and in part as a result of the tacit prior valuation of 
indefinitely many other sentences, themselves not in turn individually indexed to 
specific observations —  if the observation bears on the given sentence, it also bears 
on the ancillary background sentences which set it up for valuation in that circum­
stance.
With experience bearing only on whole systems of sentences, rather than on 
individual sentences, Quine despaired of finding a way to conceive each sentence as 
separately controlled by data —  by non-linguistic observational conditions. Perhaps 
it was this that led him to the belief that even in the face of a totality of possible data, 
there would be room for theoretical variation in science, and that even given all 
possible information about a language-user’s verbal behaviour in conjunction with 
observable portions o f the environment, there would remain undecidable questions 
of translation.
In any event, he did pick this pessimistic route, and when we take his theory that 
observational data underdetermine the truth and meaning of expressions, and com­
bine it with his latent empiricism —  the view that only relations between expressions 
and things observable could constitute the meaning and troth o f an expression, 
classically conceived —  we get his indeterminacy theory. Where the meaning or
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troth of a sentence are empirically underdetermined, there is no ultimate fact of the 
matter about them. Likewise, anything about a  sentence traditionally thought depend­
ent upon the sentence’s meaning will be indeterminate — its ontological commit­
ments, whether it is analytic or synthetic, whether it is consistent with a given sentence, 
whether a  given sentence is its proper philosophical analysis, and so on.
Now, Michael Dummett and Karl Schick have objected to Quine on the ground 
that, whatever he may say about meaning being indeterminate, he offers a naturalized 
model for language in which indeterminacy is nowhere to be found. They both 
interpret him as holding that there are some expressions in languages and theories 
which are effectively conditioned in their assentibility or truth to adjudicating 
experiences — and that all other expressions are conditioned in their turn to selections 
of these expressions. Schick holds that theory-sentences are “conditioned” to obser­
vation-sentences, which are conditioned to the stimulus-environment, while Dummett 
speaks of observation-sentences being “connected” to theory-sentences, with the 
stimulus-environment impinging on the observation-sentences.
Schick then observes that at worst, radical translation is demonstrated to be a 
two-stage process, involving first the translation o f observation-sentences by their 
stimulus-condition, and second, the translation of theory-sentences by the observa­
tion-sentence complexes which serve as their assentibility-conditions. He then won­
ders how sentence-meaning and translation could be indeterminate in this schem a— 
it seems every sentence has a traceable stimulus-significance, and that these suffice 
to individuate meanings. He grants that the sign-design forms of the observation 
sentences to which theory-sentences are keyed in distinct languages are different, but 
thinks these differences “divide through” in the translational process. Surely, he 
argues, Quine doesn’t think that sign-design differences make for differences in the 
intuitive meanings of expressions? But then what could make stimulus-synonymous 
translational hypotheses seem intuitively different? He might also have asked what 
determines which translation-hypotheses are thought to be in specific competition as 
the possible meanings o f a given away-language expression if for some reason 
stimulus-synonymy fails to hold at (say) theoretical levels. And whatever it is, why 
does it fail to be criterial and constitutive of meaning? W hat could make expressions 
which should thus be synonymous, seem to be logically incompatible, if Quine’s 
naturalistic account is correct? ^
Dummett focuses on the connections between sentences in what he takes to be 
Quine’s model. He argues that if experience impinges on the periphery of a language- 
“web”, and its effects are inwardly transmitted by the connection between elements in 
the w eb— in the articulated structure of the language —  then every expression is 
determinately controlled by experience, via the structural principles of the language. 
Inter-sentential connections are effectively logical connections, and sentences expres­
sive of the interanimatory principles of the net would be the logical troths of the 
language. Everything again appears perfectly determinate. Now, if Quine were to hold 
that the theory sentences interior to the web somehow constrain or promote the 
assentibility of the sentences in the web in direct encounter with perceptual stimuli, we 
are entitled to ask in what sense the outer sentences are conditioned at all to the 
stimulus-environment, while if the interim’ sentences are susceptible of independent
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behaviour, we are entitled to ask in what sense peripheral sentences impinge upon 
them. And what would be left o f the idea that the sentence network has a  structure; that 
the model gives explanations of the rules governing the behaviour o f its constituents? 
The “model” is no model at all. Its business is the specification o f the principles 
governing language use, and yet these have all been exceptioned to the point of 
vacuity. The indeterminacy theory looks to be the very antithesis of a model or theory 
of language.
These seem like very strong objections indeed, and at die very least they bring 
out important conditions for the adequacy of any theory of language —  conditions 
which w ill figure again, shortly. But they also fail in two respects. First, they are 
somewhat uncharitable to Quine, leaving entirely out of account his doctrine of 
background-language relativity, a  doctrine which can go some way in accommodat­
ing the foregoing problems. Second, Dummett and Schick nowhere come to terms 
with the holistic considerations which a  theory of language must address, and which 
may have induced Q uine's indeterministic predilections in the first place.
Quine takes the significance of an expression to be a function of its observable 
conditions of use, as do Positivists. But he thinks that some of these conditions are 
linguistic; that there are indefinitely many sentences to which one must be disposed 
to assent before one w ill assoit to a given sentence in a given perceptual circumstance. 
Together, the perceptual stimuli and the ancillary assumptions determine the assenti- 
bility of the given sentence, and this consists in a partial reply to Dummett, illustrating 
how there is something to explain every veibal disposition in Quine’s model. Further, 
where a given experience inclines assent to a sentence incompatible with ancillary 
assumptions, two principles decide the distribution of assent —  change as little as 
possible, while maximally accommodating experience. These principles also afford 
a redefinition of the observation/theory distinction —  the most easily revised sen­
tences being observational, the least révisable being logical or analytic, with the 
remaining being variously theoretic. The resistance o f verbal practice to revision is 
directly proportionate to its ubiquity in the network, logical rules being very pervasive, 
direct reports o f perceptual experience being relatively isolated.
This appears to be a  complete answer to Dummett, and we can also see how some 
of Quine’s more radical theses are introduced — among the conditions upon assentfor 
a  given sentence are other sentences in the language, but since they are not determi- 
nately subject to control by the experiential conditions external to and common 
between languages, their significance is not specifiable in a way that could be 
transferred across languages; that would make sense of the idea that expressions in 
different languages can say the same things. So, to the extent that an expression has 
purely linguistic assent-conditions (not in turn susceptible to extra-linguistic control), 
its sense is relativized to the language o f discourse (observational-sentences being the 
most interlinguistically objective). Now, classically, the relation between a  sign and 
what it signifies is arbitrary; the choice o f symbol doesn’t determine its material 
content. Yet here, symbol-choice (selection of a language of discourse) does seem to 
contribute to sense, while since classically this choice is thought irrelevant to the way 
the world is, there is no worldly fact o f the matter about an expression’s truth, except 
relative to a language. O f course, if  meaning and truth are language-relative, so is
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ontology, for ontological commitments are part of meanings. Thus translation 
imposes the ontology of the home-language on the away-language (a similar story 
may be told about thermes empirically equivalent in the whole). Finally, since every 
verbal disposition is in large measure adopted on the basis o f linguistic pragmatics, 
any disposition, even one taken to exemplify an analytic relation, is révisable in pursuit 
of economy and accommodation to the data, while no revision should be trivial, owing 
to the experiential significance which infuses the whole network in various partial 
degrees of attenuation.
W ell, if Dummett is answered, Schick isn’t  Classically, the inscriptions, sounds 
and gestures which are deployed in linguistic activity don’t themselves possess an 
intrinsic sense, but only a functional one. Yet Quine’s theory seems to involve this 
very thing. In holding that the intuitive sense o f an expression derives from its 
observable conditions of use, and that extra-linguistic observables underdetermine 
expression-sense, he is forced to make up the slack by effectively endowing sentences 
(qua observable sign-designs) with intuitive sense, or with the capacity to endow such 
sense to the sentences which they condition.
It is just on this point that Quine’s theory must finally falter. In the first place, 
letting sign-designs endow meaning to themselves or their fellows won’t achieve what 
Quine needs. If a sign-design has intrinsic sense, then to know the sign-design must 
be to know the sense. But then the expression would never need translation — 
everyone who knew of it would know what it meant, and there wouldn’t be anything 
to prevent it being directly used in any language. Further, the sentence’s meaning 
could not be held indeterminate, for its sense is by hypothesis here self-determinate. 
Moreover, the sentence could not be said to condition another sentence — to constrain 
or promote its deployment —  for then its conditioning role would be its significance, 
and once that was known, the role could be displaced onto any arbitrarily chosen 
symbol, which would violate the hypothesis of the sui generis significance of the 
sentence. The same error would be involved in holding that any sentence was its 
translation, however arbitrarily. Such sentences, therefore, cannot be held as things 
to which the meanings of other sentences are relative, nor can they be said to 
supplement the conditions of use o f any expression, nor should they be taken as the 
cause of the underdetermination o f meaning and truth by experience, if such there be.
In the second place, there aren’t such things as intrinsically meaningful expres­
sions, as we can tell from the fact that if presented with unfamiliar sign-designs, we 
can’t form the slightest defensible intuitive notion of their sense. Even if we are 
presented with many such designs, and are allowed to know how they may be used 
relative to each other, at best all we can do is discern the logical relations they might 
be taken to exemplify, on assumption that they have a meaning at all (e.g., co- 
assentibies are consistent). Alternatively, we might suppose that some of them are 
about others o f them, if some seem conditionally assented to upon the physical display 
of others. But the first possibility is allowed for by Positivism, where logical relations 
are held to be materially empty. And in the second possibility, we merely have some 
expression qua sign-designs serving as the observable conditions of use for other 
expressions qua meaningful expressions, as when the latter remark the physical 
properties of the former — again, no intrinsic meaning.
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If it is trae that data ultimately underdetermine theory, and that experience 
underdetermines meaning, we have at least seen that the residual slack cannot be taken 
up by anything internal to linguistic form. I suspect, however, that there is a  way to 
provision empirical control for every expression in language holistically conceived.
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A R E SPE A K IN G  AND M EA N IN G  
EV A LU A TIV E A C T IV IT IE S ?
Alexander Matthews, Salisbury, Zimbabwe
In this paper, I wish to suggest that speaking and communicated meaning are 
evaluative activities. “Evaluative” here means based on personal judgement as 
opposed to what is desirable. In otherrespects such evaluations are nothing like moral 
and aesthetic judgements. I use the term here in a provocative sense, and not as a 
comparison with ethics. Such comparisons and differentiations though interesting, 
must be dealt with elsewhere. In regard to conversation at least, I will suggest that 
speaking and meaning —  what is conveyed —  are not rule-governed forms o f 
behaviour. There is a sense in which they are, but only if they are at one remove from 
conversation. The meaning can then be regarded as the sentence observed in writing 
as a result o f contextual considerations, including what is actually said.
The Theoretical ineffability of meaning' defies an historical account of the use 
of that term. The suggestion or prescription is that it is an impossible term to deal with. 
This may be so conceptually, if the historical use of the term is too confused to stand 
up to inspection. In what follows, in the first o f its two characteristics “meaning”
